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INTRODUCTION
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme Court of the
United States reaffirmed its commitment to protect the First
Amendment right to freedom of association. Unfortunately, it did so
by holding that states could not protect gays from discrimination by
forcing public associations to admit them. In Christian Legal Society v.
Walker, a panel of the Seventh Circuit applied Dale to invalidate the
antidiscrimination policy of the Law School at Southern Illinois
University, as applied to a Christian student group wishing to exclude
gays. However, the Seventh Circuit did not merely apply Dale; it
extended it by holding that a school could not even deny official
recognition to a student group that chose to discriminate against gays.
This Note will briefly discuss the history of public
accommodations and antidiscrimination laws, and how such laws
came into conflict with the First Amendment right to free association. I
will then examine the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Christian Law
Society and explain how the Seventh Circuit’s expansion of Dale
could potentially render invalid nearly all public accommodations and
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S., Stanford University 1999.
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antidiscrimination laws protecting gays, reversing years of progress in
removing discrimination based on sexual orientation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Public Accommodations and Antidiscrimination Laws
After the Civil War, Congress1 and a number of states2 enacted
statutes outlawing discrimination in places of public accommodation.3
In response to the Supreme Court’s 1883 invalidation4 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, several states, including Illinois,5 enacted public
accommodations laws restricting discrimination based on race.6 These
state laws protected the rights of racial minorities and other groups
from discrimination in public accommodations until the federal
government passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 Illinois has since
1

Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2
Between 1865 and 1875, Massachusetts, New York, and Kansas, along with
several Southern states under Northern control, passed public accommodations laws.
Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public
Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 216, 238-39 (1978).
3
The 1875 Act banned discrimination on the basis of race in, among other
places, “inns, public conveyances, . . . theatres, and other places of public
amusement.” Civil Rights Act of 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. at 336.
4
The Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant
Congress the power to pass prospective laws enforcing civil rights against
infringement by non-state actors, and that any legislation passed by Congress
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment must “necessarily be corrective in character.”
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17-18.
5
Illinois’ current public accommodations and antidiscrimination laws can be
found at 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/1-101 to 5/10-104 (2001).
6
Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island passed public accommodations laws
in 1884 and 1885. MILTON KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 157 (Greenwood
Press 1983) (1961).
7
The current federal civil rights laws can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to
2000h-6 (2000).
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broadened the scope of its antidiscrimination laws to protect more
disadvantaged groups,8 and to provide that protection in a greater
number of public places.9
Public and private law schools have instituted antidiscrimination
policies protecting sexual-orientation since the late 1970s,10 and today,
nearly every accredited law school in the country has a broad
antidiscrimination policy.11 Southern Illinois University (“SIU” or the
“University”) has two such policies: the Affirmative Action/Equal
Employment Opportunity Policy,12 and a separate policy promulgated
by the SIU Board of Trustees.13 These two policies will be referred to
in this Note as the “EEO Policy” and the “Unlawful Discrimination
Policy,” respectively.
B. The First Amendment and the Right to Association
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from passing any law
“respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or the right of the
8

For example, women, Vietnam veterans, the elderly, and homosexuals. 775
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1-102.
9
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5-101(A) (2001).
10
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp.
2d 269, 280 (D.N.J. 2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded,
126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
11
These policies vary from school to school, but typically contain language
stating the law school’s commitment to a “policy against discrimination based upon
age, color, handicap or disability, ethnic or national origin, race, religion, religious
creed, gender (including discrimination taking the form of sexual harassment),
marital, parental or veteran status, or sexual orientation.” Id.
12
“It is the policy of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale to provide
equal employment and education opportunities for all qualified persons without
regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, status as a disabled
veteran or a veteran of the Vietnam era, sexual orientation, or marital status.”
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 05-4070GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 (S.D. Ill Jul. 5, 2005)
13
“No student constituency body or recognized student organization shall be
authorized unless it adheres to all appropriate federal or state laws concerning
nondiscrimination and equal opportunity.” Id.
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people peaceably to assemble.”14 Although the First Amendment does
not explicitly grant a right to associate, the Supreme Court recognized
that group association “undeniably enhance[s]” the rights to free
speech, freedom of religion, and free assembly.15 The freedom of an
individual “to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for
the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from
interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”16 As such,
the Court has held that the First Amendment implicitly grants the
freedom “to associate with others in a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”17
The Court’s early freedom of association jurisprudence developed
in cases arising from outwardly expressive groups, like the NAACP
and political parties.18 For members of minority groups or individuals
with dissident opinions, the right to freedom of expression was
enhanced by the ability to gather together with like-minded individuals
to make their ideas visible to a greater audience.19 Underlying the
reasoning in these cases was the concern for privacy of association,
which the Court considered often “indispensable to preservation of
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs.”20 For members of political parties, the ability to associate

14

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); accord Bd. of
Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987); Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
16
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (1984); see also NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460-61 (“state
action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to
the closest scrutiny”).
17
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
18
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. of Oh., 459 U.S. 87
(1982) (Socialist Workers Party); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975)
(Democratic Party); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP, 357 U.S. 449.
19
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
20
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
15
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with one another free from state interference was essential to the
party’s ability to successfully promote its political beliefs.21
In Healy v. James, the Supreme Court held that the right to
freedom of association extended to student groups on college and
university campuses because students did not “‘shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.’”22 The Court acknowledged that school officials
could proscribe certain conduct to maintain order on college
campuses, but that “First Amendment protections should apply with
[the same] force on college campuses [as] in the community at
large.”23 In Healy, Central Connecticut State College (“CCSC”)
students wishing to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society (“SDS”) were denied official recognition by the CCSC’s
president because the national SDS organization had been involved in
violent demonstrations at other colleges.24 However, the connections
between the local chapter and the national organization, beyond their
shared name, was limited; the CCSC chapter proclaimed independence
from the national organization, and expressed disagreement with
certain of the national organization’s statements.25 Because the CCSC
SDS was in violation of no rule issued by the school, the Court held
that it had been denied official recognition merely on the basis of the
president’s disagreement with the philosophy of the CCSC SDS.26 So
long as the viewpoints expressed by CCSC were not aimed at
“‘inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite
or produce such action,’”27 CCSC SDS could not be denied official

21

Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92.
408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
23
Healy, 408 U.S. at 180.
24
Id. at 171-72.
25
Id. at 186-87.
26
Id. at 187.
27
Id. at 188 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
22
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recognition without also being denied its fundamental First
Amendment right to associate.28
After the Court had established that there existed a constitutional
right to associate for First Amendment purposes, it recognized a
corresponding right to define the boundaries of that association: that
freedom of association “plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate.”29 For example, in a case involving a conflict between the
national Democratic Party and a Wisconsin election law requiring
open primaries,30 the Supreme Court sided with the national party,
holding that, for the purposes of the national party convention, the
national party had a First Amendment right to decide the method in
which its members were selected so they would best promote the
national party’s message.31 The Court noted that an essential function
of a political party is to express viewpoints on issues important to its
members and to make collective decisions concordant with those
viewpoints.32 The inclusion of persons with viewpoints opposed to
those of the party’s members could distort this collective decisionmaking and substantially interfere with the party’s ability to
collectively advance its members’ interests.33 Following this
reasoning, the Court held that the Wisconsin open primaries law
violated the Democratic Party’s right to exclude certain individuals
from its political association.34
The Court realized that the right to exclude, if exercised
injudiciously, could be used as a tool to perpetuate discrimination,
since “the very exercise of the freedom to associate by some may
28

Healy, 408 U.S. at 187-88.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
30
In an “open” party primary, voters may vote for a party’s candidates without
being members of that party. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette,
450 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1981). According to the invalidated Wisconsin law, delegates
at a party’s national convention were required to cast their votes in accordance with
the outcome of the open primary election. Id. at 112.
31
Id. at 122.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 125-26.
29

335

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/12

6

York: Left Without a Prayer: Can Antidiscrimination Regulations Protect

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

serve to infringe that freedom for others.”35 This language predicted
the Court’s later decisions in Roberts v. United States Jaycees and
Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, where the Court denied
the United States Jaycees’ and the Rotary Club’s attempts to dress up
their discrimination against women in First Amendment clothing.36 In
Roberts, the Court held that the right to expressive association may be
limited by “regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”37 The
Court applied this test to the challenged state public accommodations
statutes in both cases, and twice held that preventing discrimination
against women was a compelling state interest unrelated to the
suppression of ideas.38 Before reaching that conclusion, however, the
Court also noted in both cases that any impairment of the associations’
abilities to express their chosen messages by the challenged statutes
was slight.39
This check on the scope of the right to expressive association was
short-lived, however. In 1995, the Court held that a Massachusetts
public accommodations statute could not compel the organizers of the
Boston Saint Patrick’s Day parade to allow a gay, lesbian, and bisexual
group to march in the parade over the organizers’ objections.40
However, the Court did not analyze Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston as it had prior expressive
association cases, primarily because it involved a parade.41 Because a

35

Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
468 U.S. 609 (1984); 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
37
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
38
Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29.
39
Admitting women would not require Rotary to abandon its various civilservice activities. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548. Any diminution of the Jaycees’ message
resulting from the admission of women was “attenuated at best.” Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 627.
40
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 581 (1995).
41
Id. at 568-70.
36
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parade is inherently and quintessentially expressive,42 and each group
marching expresses a message, the Court reasoned that selection of
those groups marching in the parade is entitled to the same First
Amendment protections given to cable operators or newspaper
editors.43 Thus, the organizers of the Saint Patrick’s Day parade could
prevent a group from marching if the parade organizers disagreed with
the message of the group.44
Five years later, the Court decided Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale,45 currently the leading case on both the doctrine of expressive
association, and the use of that doctrine by public groups to
discriminate against homosexuals. In that case, the Boy Scouts were
held by the New Jersey Supreme Court to be a place of public
accommodation and were therefore compelled by New Jersey’s public
accommodations statute to reinstate James Dale, a scoutmaster whom
the Scouts had expelled because he was homosexual.46 The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court and held
that the New Jersey statute unconstitutionally infringed the expressive
association rights of the Boy Scouts because the presence of Dale
within its ranks caused the Scouts to express a message that was
contrary to the message that the Scouts wished to express, namely, that
homosexuality is acceptable.47
Distilling its prior expressive association jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court articulated a three-element test for expressive
association claims in Dale: a state action violates a particular group’s
First Amendment right to expressive association when (1) that group is
an “expressive association,”48 (2) that group’s ability to advocate
42

Id. at 568-69; see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)
(A peaceful protest march is “an exercise of [First Amendment] rights in their most
pristine and classic form.”).
43
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 636 (1994); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
44
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
45
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
46
Id. at 644-47.
47
Id. at 653.
48
Id. at 648.
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“public or private viewpoints” is significantly impacted by the state
action at issue,49 and (3) the interest furthered by the state action at
issue does not justify the burden on the group’s expressive
association.50 The Court appeared to give credence to the concern it
voiced in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, that the freedom of
association should not be used as a means to uphold invidious
discrimination,51 when it noted that an expressive association cannot
“erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that
mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its
message.”52 However, the Court undermined that statement just a few
lines before making it when it held that it was required to give
substantial deference to an association’s view of what would impair its
expression.53 The Court held that the Boy Scouts had sufficiently
demonstrated that promotion of homosexuality as a “‘legitimate form
of behavior’” was contrary to the message they wished to express, and
that retaining Dale as a scoutmaster would force them to express that
message to the Boy Scouts’ membership as well as the community at
large.54
What began as a recognition of the right for small, politically
unpopular groups to assemble and make their viewpoints heard55 has
become a means of judicially-enforced discrimination against the
politically unpopular minority of gay Americans.56

49

Id. at 650.
Id. at 658-59.
51
417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
52
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 654.
55
See generally Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. of Oh., 459
U.S. 87 (1982); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
56
See generally Dale, 530 U.S. 640; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
50
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II. CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. WALKER57
A. Factual and Procedural Background
The Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) is a national organization of
lawyers and law students dedicated to practicing law in a manner
consistent with the teachings of the Bible.58 The Christian Legal
Society has chapters at law schools across the country, including the
law school at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (“SIU” or the
“University”).59 CLS requires members and officers to affirm a
statement of faith,60 and CLS members must agree to follow a strict
57

453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
CLS’s mission is “[t]o be the national grassroots network of lawyers and law
students, associated with others, committed to proclaiming, loving and serving Jesus
Christ, through all we do and say in the practice of law, and advocating biblical
conflict reconciliation, legal assistance for the poor and the needy, religious freedom
and the sanctity of human life.” Christian Legal Society, Vision and Mission,
http://www.clsnet.org/clsPages/vision.php (last visited Dec. 2, 2006). CLS describes
its purpose as “[t]ransforming the legal profession for good one heart and mind at a
time by enlisting lawyers and law students everywhere to faithfully serve Jesus
Christ in the diligent study and ethical practice of law by ministering to the poor,
reconciling people in conflict, defending life and protecting the religious liberties of
all people.” Id.
59
Christian Legal Society, Law Student Ministry Contact List,
http://www.clsnet.org/lsmPages/keyContactLst.phpd.
60
The statement of faith reads as follows:
Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in:
* One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and
Holy Spirit.
* God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth.
* The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God’s only Son, conceived
of the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious
death for our sins through which we receive eternal life; His
bodily resurrection and personal return.
* The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of
regeneration.
* The Bible as the inspired Word of God.
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 05-4070GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *1 (S.D. Ill Jul. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.clsnet.org/clsPages/statement.php.
58
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interpretation of Christian dogma, which proscribes homosexual
conduct as immoral.61
The CLS chapter at SIU62 was recognized as an official student
organization, and as a result of this recognition, CLS received various
benefits.63 These benefits included access to the law school’s bulletin
boards, private meeting space within the law school, access to the law
school’s website and publications, access to the school’s email lists,
eligibility for funding through the law school, and the right to use the
SIU name.64 On March 25, 2005, CLS was notified by the Dean of
SIU Law School that, because homosexuals were not allowed to be
members, it was in violation of the EEO Policy and the Unlawful
Discrimination Policy, and its status as an officially recognized student
organization was revoked.65
CLS filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois seeking an injunction restoring its status as an
officially recognized student organization alleging, inter alia, that
SIU’s actions had violated CLS’s First Amendment rights to freedom
of speech and freedom of expressive association.66 The district court
noted that a school does not run afoul of the First Amendment when it
denies official recognition to a student group “that reserves the right to
violate any valid campus rules with which it disagrees,”67 and found
the EEO Policy to be facially neutral and otherwise valid.68 Because of
the early stage of the case, the court could not yet determine whether
the EEO Policy had been applied neutrally to CLS.69 As such, the
district court denied CLS’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
finding that CLS had failed to demonstrate the necessary likelihood of
61

Christian Legal Soc’y, 2005 WL 1606448, at *1.
For the remainder of this Note, “CLS” will refer to the SIU chapter.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at *2.
66
Id.
67
Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 193-94 (1972)).
68
Christian Legal Soc’y, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2.
69
Id. at *2 n.2.
62
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success on its First Amendment claims, calling it, “at best … a close
question.”70 CLS appealed and filed a motion for an injunction
pending appeal, which was granted by the seventh circuit.71
B. The Seventh Circuit Decision
A divided panel of the seventh circuit reversed the district court’s
denial of CLS’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded the
case to the district court with direction to enter a preliminary
injunction on behalf of CLS.72 Writing for the majority, Judge Sykes,
joined by Judge Kanne, held that CLS had demonstrated a likelihood
of success on the merits of both of its First Amendment claims:
expressive association and the denial of access to a public forum.73
Judge Wood, in dissent, argued that CLS had not met its burden of
proof and that the record was too incomplete to hold that the district
court’s findings were an abuse of discretion.74
The majority first questioned whether the district court was
correct in finding that CLS had, in fact, violated any stated SIU
policy.75 There was no indication in the record or on oral argument that
CLS had violated any state or federal antidiscrimination laws, so CLS
could not have violated the Unlawful Discrimination Policy.76 The
majority also questioned whether the EEO Policy applied to CLS, as
CLS did not employ anyone, nor was CLS a “mouthpiece[]” of SIU.77
Judge Wood responded in her dissent that the EEO Policy applied to
CLS because it requires that the University grant all “educational
opportunities” without discrimination.78 Because participation in
student organizations can be central to the educational experience in
70

Id. at *3.
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859 (2006).
72
Id. at 867.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 876 (Wood, J. dissenting).
75
Id. at 860.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 860-61.
78
Id. at 872 (Wood, J. dissenting).
71

341

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/12

12

York: Left Without a Prayer: Can Antidiscrimination Regulations Protect

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

universities,79 SIU would have to provide equal access to all student
organizations to give effect to the EEO Policy.80 Regardless, the
majority doubted that CLS had violated the EEO Policy because CLS
did not discriminate based on sexual orientation, but rather excluded
individuals from membership based upon their “belief and behavior.”81
This argument was moot, according to the dissent, since the record
was silent regarding whether CLS had ever admitted as a member an
individual who had repented past homosexual behavior.82 Further,
given the liberty interest in private sexual autonomy recognized by the
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,83 Judge Wood argued that SIU
could validly interpret the EEO Policy to apply to discrimination based
on homosexual conduct as well as status.84
Next, the court addressed CLS’s expressive association claim.
Relying heavily on Dale, Roberts, and Healy, the majority concluded
that SIU’s application of the EEO Policy forced CLS to accept
homosexuals as members, and therefore significantly affected CLS’s
ability to express its viewpoint that homosexuality is immoral.85 The
dissent disagreed, arguing that SIU merely decided to withdraw certain
benefits from CLS because CLS was not in compliance with the EEO
Policy.86
The court then determined that SIU had violated CLS’s free
speech right by revoking CLS’s right to enter a public forum it was
79

See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 222-23
(2000); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995).
80
Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 873 (Wood, J. dissenting).
81
Id. at 860. According to CLS, a person who was homosexual, but repented
past homosexual conduct and agreed not to engage in homosexual conduct in the
future, could be admitted as a member. Id. at 858.
82
Id. at 873 (Wood, J. dissenting).
83
539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Supreme Court, holding invalid a Texas statute
criminalizing homosexual sodomy, noted that homosexual couples have the same
autonomy to choose private, intimate relationships as do heterosexual couples. Id. at
574.
84
Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 873 (Wood, J. dissenting).
85
Id. at 863.
86
Id. at 873-74 (Wood, J. dissenting).
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entitled to access.87 Although the record was too incomplete88 to
address the proper level of scrutiny89 under which to evaluate the
forum created by SIU, the majority nonetheless concluded that under
any level of scrutiny, SIU had violated CLS’s free speech rights
because it had applied the EEO Policy to CLS in a viewpointdiscriminatory fashion.90 The dissent reasoned that if the record was
insufficiently developed to decide on the level of scrutiny, it was
likewise insufficiently developed to determine that SIU had unfairly
applied the EEO Policy.91
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Seventh Circuit misapplied the Supreme Court’s expressive
association jurisprudence, extending First Amendment protection
beyond the sorts of activities typically covered
In reaching its decision regarding CLS’s expressive association
claim, the majority relied extensively on the Supreme Court’s
expressive association cases, specifically Dale, Hurley, Roberts, and
Healy.92 However, the cases relied upon by the majority are
distinguishable in three important respects: first, CLS was not
compelled to associate with anyone, nor was CLS forced to modify the
content of its expression; second, SIU did not prevent CLS from
associating on or around the SIU campus; and finally, SIU has a
compelling interest in eliminating invidious discrimination within its
educational community. Based on the first two facts, the Seventh
Circuit should have held that SIU’s enforcement of the EEO Policy did
not significantly impair CLS’s associational rights. The third fact
87

Id. at 867.
Id.
89
See generally Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106107 (2001); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983), for discussions of
the levels of scrutiny afforded to differing public fora.
90
Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 866-67.
91
Id. at 874-75 (Wood, J. dissenting).
92
Id. at 861-64.
88
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should have led the Seventh Circuit to the conclusion that any
violation of CLS’s associational rights was justified. The majority’s
misapplication of the Supreme Court’s expressive association
jurisprudence overextended the protections properly granted to
expressive associations to the potential detriment of all state
antidiscrimination policies.93
1. CLS’s claim was distinguishable from prior expressive
association cases because CLS was not compelled to admit
anyone as a member.
To succeed in an expressive association claim, a group must first
show that it is expressive association.94 The group must then
demonstrate that its “ability to advocate public or private viewpoints”
has been significantly impacted by government action.95 In Roberts,
the Supreme Court recognized that “forc[ing] [a] group to accept
members it does not desire” may violate the group’s associational
freedom because it significantly interferes with the internal structure
and affairs of the group.96 Although the Jaycees were forced to include
women by the public accommodations statute at issue in Roberts, the
Supreme Court nonetheless held the statute to be valid because the
state’s interest in ending discrimination against women was
important,97 and the Jaycees’ associational freedoms were not
significantly impaired.98 The Supreme Court’s subsequent expressive
association decisions also involved compelled association: the Boy
Scouts were required under a New Jersey public accommodations law
to reinstate Mr. Dale as an assistant scoutmaster,99 and the organizers
93

For an examination of recent developments in the expressive association
doctrine as contrary to antidiscrimination laws, see Jed Rubenfeld, Essay, The AntiAntidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1156-1163 (2002).
94
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). SIU did not contest
CLS’s status as an expressive association. Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 862.
95
Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
96
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
97
Id. at 625.
98
Id. at 627.
99
Dale, 530 U.S. at 646.
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of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade were forced to allow a group of
gay and lesbian individuals to march in their parade.100 In a recent case
addressing an expressive association claim, the Court held there was
no violation of expressive association rights caused by granting
military recruiters mandatory access to a law school campus because
military recruiters did not “become members of the school’s
expressive association.”101
Nowhere in its complaint did CLS allege that it had been
compelled by SIU to admit anyone,102 and the district court found no
such compulsion.103 Although the majority acknowledged that there
was no actual compulsion, it held SIU’s withdrawal of recognition was
constitutionally equivalent to a compelled association, and therefore
violated CLS’s expressive association rights.104 The majority relied on
Healy to reach the conclusion that SIU could not use the threat of
derecognition to force CLS to accept openly gay students as members
and officers.105 However, the majority’s reliance on Healy for this
proposition was puzzling, as the facts in Healy did not involve a
student association compelled to admit members, but rather a student
association prevented from associating at all.106
While the majority correctly noted that First Amendment rights
are protected from indirect as well as direct interference,107 a state may
make certain value judgments and implement those judgments through

100

Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 563-64 (1995).
101
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct.
1297, 1312 (2006).
102
Verified Complaint, Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of
Law v. Walker, 2005 WL 1606448 (S.D. Ill. Jul. 5, 2005) (No. 05-4070-GPM).
103
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No.
05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 (S.D. Ill Jul. 5, 2005).
104
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 864 (2006).
105
Id.
106
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 176 (1972).
107
Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 864 (citing Healy, 408 U.S. at 183).
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the allocation of public resources.108 In addition, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that Congress may attach conditions to the receipt
of federal funds, even when those conditions intrude upon the exercise
of certain fundamental rights.109 Although a state may not withhold a
benefit to compel individuals to forgo First Amendment rights, a state
may, within broad limits, appropriate public funds to establish a
program and then define the limits of that program.110
SIU created a program of recognized student organizations, and
established criteria, including meeting the EEO Policy, for becoming a
recognized student organization.111 Because CLS refused to admit
homosexuals as members, SIU informed CLS that it had violated the
EEO Policy, and CLS was therefore no longer allowed to participate in
the program of recognized student organizations.112 The majority
asked what purpose was served by “forcing CLS to accept members
whose activities violate its creed other than eradicating or neutralizing
particular beliefs contained in that creed.”113 However, nowhere in the
record before the Seventh Circuit was there any indication that SIU
108

Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (holding that, despite a
woman’s fundamental right to choose to terminate a pregnancy, Connecticut is under
no obligation to use public funds to subsidize abortions for indigent women).
109
See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)
(plurality) (mandated use of Internet filters on library computers where Internet
access was procured with federal assistance did not violate library patrons’ First
Amendment rights); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (prevention of familyplanning funds from being used by programs mentioning abortion did not violate
either free speech rights of doctors or patients’ rights to choose to terminate
pregnancy); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984) (forbidding a
college receiving federal funding from discriminating on the basis of gender did not
violate that college’s First Amendment rights); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1306-07 (2006) (although
the Court held that Congress could directly compel law schools to accept military
recruiters, it noted that the law schools were “free to decline the federal funds”).
110
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 210-11.
111
Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 4, Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d 853
(No. 05-3239).
112
Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 858.
113
Id. at 863.
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created the EEO Policy to force student groups like CLS to include
members with which those groups did not wish to associate. Like
virtually all law schools across the country,114 SIU had a preexisting
antidiscrimination policy, generally applied, that precluded
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age, disability, . . . sexual orientation, or marital status,”115 and
required that all recognized student groups comply with that policy.116
SIU found that CLS was in violation of this policy and revoked its
recognized status.
Because SIU did not force CLS to admit anyone, the majority’s
reliance on Dale and Hurley is misplaced. Rather, as in Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, CLS “has attempted to
stretch [the] . . . First Amendment doctrine[]” of expressive association
“well beyond the sort of activities” protected by that doctrine,117 and
the majority should not have extended First Amendment protection to
CLS. Because Dale significantly weakened a state’s ability to enforce
antidiscrimination laws against certain groups, courts should be wary
of extending the holding of Dale.118 By shielding CLS from the
enforcement of SIU’s EEO Policy despite the fact that CLS wished to
avail itself of the benefits attendant to official recognition by SIU, the
majority of the panel did just that. This overextension of Dale could
potentially lead to the invalidation of any antidiscrimination policy
protecting homosexuals, and it calls into question the validity of
antidiscrimination policies generally.

114

Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F.
Supp. 2d 269, 280 (D.N.J. 2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d and
remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
115
Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 858.
116
Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 111, at 4.
117
126 S. Ct. at 1313.
118
Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 767,
810 n.96 (2001) (taken to its logical conclusion, the holding in Dale could allow a
Christian homeowners’ association, wishing to exclude African-Americans, Jews,
homosexuals, or anyone else on the basis of religious belief, to demand that any law
challenging their discrimination be subjected to strict scrutiny).
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2. Although SIU withdrew from CLS the benefits conferred to
officially recognized student groups, SIU did not prevent CLS
from associating on or around the SIU campus.
The majority argued that the facts before it were similar to the
facts in Healy in “all material respects.”119 However, the facts in Healy
are readily distinguishable, as Judge Wood noted in her dissent.120 Not
only did the president of the college in Healy refuse to confer
recognized status to the student group (“SDS”) in that case, he denied
SDS the ability to meet on campus and took the “extraordinary step of
refusing to let students meet (i.e. sit together) in the campus coffee
shop!”121 SIU did nothing so drastic to CLS. CLS was still able to
meet on campus, and, as recognized by the district court, its abilities to
“assemble, evangelize, and proselytize [were] not impaired.”122
Although CLS’s access to physical bulletin-board space at SIU was
restricted when it was derecognized, CLS was still free to distribute
flyers on campus.123 In addition, as recognized by the dissent, the
importance of physical bulletin-board space on modern campuses has
diminished markedly in the years since Healy was decided: “[m]ost
universities and colleges, and most college-aged students,
communicate through email, websites, and hosts like MySpace®.”124
All of these avenues remained available to CLS, so CLS had
substantial means to get its message out to the SIU community,125
unlike the students in Healy.
Not only are the facts in Healy materially distinguishable from
this case, the majority overlooked an important holding in Healy. The
Healy Court held that SDS’s associational rights were violated when
the college refused, without justification, to grant it official
119

Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 864.
Id. at 874 (Wood, J. dissenting).
121
Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972)).
122
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No.
05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 (S.D. Ill Jul. 5, 2005).
123
Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 111, at 11.
124
Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 874 (Wood, J. dissenting).
125
Id.
120
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recognition.126 The Court further held that “the benefits of
participation in the internal life of the college community may be
denied to any group that reserves the right to violate any valid campus
rules with which it disagrees.”127 This is directly analogous to the case
before the Seventh Circuit: CLS sought “the benefits of participation”
as a recognized student group at SIU, but also wished to violate SIU’s
EEO Policy. Under the correct interpretation of Healy, SIU had every
right to derecognize CLS. The majority recognized SIU’s “interest in
maintaining order and enforcing reasonable campus rules,” but stated
that SIU could not apply the EEO Policy to CLS because it was aimed
at CLS’s “advocacy or philosophy.”128 Although CLS alleged that SIU
had singled it out for enforcement of the EEO Policy,129 the record
before the Seventh Circuit was undeveloped. As noted in the dissent,
SIU had not yet submitted any evidence to counter CLS’s assertion
that the EEO Policy had been applied to it unfairly.130 Yet, the majority
nevertheless held that SIU had no purpose in enforcing its
antidiscrimination policy other than “neutralizing particular beliefs” of
CLS.131 As addressed in greater detail below, SIU’s purpose in
enforcing its EEO Policy was not to disadvantage CLS, but to further
the compelling goal of eliminating discrimination within student
organizations.
3. SIU has a compelling interest in eliminating invidious
discrimination within its educational community.
The final element of the Supreme Court’s expressive association
test is the balancing of interests.132 Even if a group shows that a
regulation has significantly impaired its ability to associate, the
regulation may still be valid if it “serve[s] compelling state interests,
126

408 U.S. at 181.
Id. at 193-94.
128
Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 864.
129
Verified Complaint, supra note 102, at ¶ 4.11.
130
Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 869 (Wood, J. dissenting).
131
Id. at 863.
132
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658-59 (2000).
127
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unrelated to the suppression of ideas,” and is narrowly-tailored to meet
those interests.133 Not only did SIU not significantly impair CLS’s
ability to associate, the majority misapplied the balancing test by
declining to recognize SIU’s compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination in the educational opportunities provided to students. In
Roberts, the Supreme Court held that Minnesota’s antidiscrimination
law “clearly further[ed] compelling state interests” by ensuring equal
access to women,134 and that a state’s interest in ensuring equal access
to all of its citizens was unrelated to the suppression of ideas.135
Most law schools have, since at least 1990, advanced
antidiscrimination policies identifying sexual orientation as a protected
class.136 These policies arose, at least in part, as a response to the
discrimination to which gay people in America have been subjected.137
In addition, the Supreme Court has long held elimination of
discrimination in education to be a compelling interest.138 More
recently, the Supreme Court has recognized that diversity among a law
school’s student body is a compelling interest that withstands strict
scrutiny.139 The Court further held that when a university’s “proper
institutional mission” is at issue, “‘good faith’ on the part of [the]
university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”140

133

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
Id. at 626.
135
Id. at 624.
136
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F.
Supp. 2d 269, 280 (D.N.J. 2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d and
remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
137
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (Colorado constitutional
amendment denied to homosexual individuals the sort of protections against
exclusion from ordinary life in society that heterosexual individuals take for
granted).
138
Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) (“discriminatory
treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational process”).
139
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
140
Id. at 329 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19
(1978)).
134
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So long as SIU applied the EEO Policy in furtherance of its
“institutional mission,” it is therefore presumed to have acted in good
faith. The Supreme Court has noted that a university can further its
educational mission by promoting participation in student groups and
other extracurricular activities.141 SIU’s determination that its
educational mission would be furthered by eliminating discrimination
in access to student groups was thus entitled to substantial deference
from the Seventh Circuit. Rather than granting SIU this deference
however, the majority casually referred to the state’s general interest in
eliminating discriminatory conduct, and then insisted, despite the
limited record before it, that SIU had enforced the EEO Policy not to
promote equality of opportunities, but rather to suppress CLS’s ability
to express its beliefs.142 Precisely because the record was so limited,
Judge Wood had no reason to believe that SIU would behave in such a
capricious manner: “I am unwilling to indulge in the presumption that
a body that is legally part of the State of Illinois is violating the federal
and state constitutions.”143
B. The Seventh Circuit should not have reversed the district court,
because the record was too incomplete to rule on CLS’s publicforum exclusion claim.
Even though the record on appeal was admittedly thin, Judge
Sykes nonetheless held that SIU had violated CLS’s right to participate
in the public forum of officially recognized student organizations.144
Judge Wood noted in her dissent that SIU had not yet presented any
evidence because of the case’s early procedural posture.145 It is
therefore unsurprising that, in the majority’s words, “every part of [the
record] . . . point[ed] to success for CLS.”146 The majority noted that
141

See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 222-23

(2000).
142

Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 863 (2006).
Id. at 874-75.
144
Id. at 867.
145
Id. at 869 (Wood, J. dissenting).
146
Id. at 867.
143
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SIU had created a some sort of public forum by choosing to grant
official recognition to certain student groups,147 but acknowledged that
the record was insufficiently developed to determine the exact type of
public forum present, and therefore the proper level of scrutiny under
which to analyze CLS’s alleged expulsion from the forum.148 The
majority argued that, regardless of the level of scrutiny it applied, SIU
had enforced the EEO Policy against CLS in a viewpoint
discriminatory way.149 CLS alleged in its complaint that SIU had
singled it out for derecognition,150 and provided the constitutions of a
few other student groups which it claimed discriminated in their
membership yet remained officially recognized.151 However, the
district court noted that “at this stage in the case, the Court need not,
and indeed cannot, decide whether the [EEO] Policy has been
neutrally applied.”152 If the record was too incomplete for the district
court to determine whether SIU had singled out CLS for enforcement
of the EEO Policy, the majority was unwise to grant a preliminary
injunction on the basis of that record.
CONCLUSION
In its expressive association jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
struck a balance between protecting the important First Amendment
rights promoted by group association and protecting the rights of
individuals to freely access publicly available goods and services. The
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Christian Legal Society v. Walker tipped
this delicate balance too far in favor of groups wishing to exclude,
because Christian Legal Society’s associational rights were not
significantly impaired in the same fashion as groups in prior
expressive association cases. The Supreme Court’s present First
147

Id. at 865.
Id. at 866.
149
Id.
150
Verified Complaint, supra note 102, at ¶ 4.11.
151
Christian Legal Soc’y, 453 F.3d at 870 (Wood, J. dissenting).
152
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No.
05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 n.2 (S.D. Ill Jul. 5, 2005).
148
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Amendment jurisprudence allows colleges and universities, as part of
their educational mission, to prevent discrimination within student
organizations, so long as any antidiscrimination policy is enforced in a
viewpoint-neutral manner. Because there was insufficient evidence
before the Seventh Circuit that Southern Illinois University had
discriminated in the application of its antidiscrimination policy to
revoke Christian Legal Society’s status as an officially recognized
student organization, the Seventh Circuit should not have reversed the
district court’s decision.
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